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[//139] The problems of falsifiability of economic theory are well-known./1/  Especially
problematic is the so-called Giffen paradox. In the face of a suitable income effect, the
slope of the demand curve is indeterminate. Since the greater part of the testing of
economic propositions involves considerations of signs and sign changes, the possibility
of the Giffen good renders the theory of consumer behavior irrefutable.
Professor Louis De Alessi has recently given a methodological appraisal of Giffen's
paradox./2/  We will consider the methodological problem which the Giffen paradox
poses for the economist intent on establishing the empirical status of microeconomic
theory. We will then turn to more general considerations of the falsifiability of economic
theory based on some recent discussions of Professor Adolf Grünbaum. These
considerations will lead us to reject De Alessi's proposal for rectifying the problem of the
paradox.   Finally, we will turn to the problem of ceteris paribus as it bears on De Alessi's
argument, and observe that he has not resolved this problem.
I.
It is well-known in elementary logic that there are two tautological implications, modus
ponens and modus tollens. In the first case, from P and P ﬁ Q, we infer Q. In modus
tollens, from not Q and P ﬁ Q, we infer not P. For scientific explanations we can
interpret the antecedent as a [139/140] theory and the consequent as a deduced
observation statement. By the very meaning of the word "theory," we cannot directly
establish the truth of the antecedent. Thus we are restricted to modus tollens, and seek
continually to express theories so that they are falsifiable. That is to say, we require that
the implicates of any theory possibly be false./3/
A given theory is falsifiable if some of its sentences are possibly false. If sentences
deducible from, say, traditional consumer's demand theory could not be known to be
false, then the theory is tautological, hence not empirical. From the theory of demand we
can derive, for instance, a sentence to the effect that not all the commodities in a system
can be complements. If conditions can then be specified, whereby under a compensated
price change, the signs of all the variations in demand Xrs are negative, then we would
say that consumer's demand theory was falsifiable.
Of course the latter would be true if the theory was falsifiable but not actually false. In
other words, we seek to specify truth-conditions of the sentences of the theory's
implicates, while excluding certain truth-values for those sentences. It might be remarked
that we can weaken or strengthen the test of a theory by appropriate modification of the
criterion of truth, weakening falsifiability to disconfirmability and vice versa. The logic
or structure of explanation remains the same, however.It is to that structure of explanation that we now turn. In traditional consumer's demand
theory we find the "Fundamental Equation of Value Theory."/4/   We deduce for a
commodity of quantity x and price p, under budget M, the uncompensated price effect:
¶x/ ¶p = [¶x/ ¶p M=Mo - ¶x/ ¶M p=po]
By Cramer's Rule, and the appropriate second order conditions, the first term on the
right-hand side is known to be negative. This is the substitution effect, which guarantees
that for a compensated price change, as price goes up, the quantity demanded goes down.
Of the partial derivative of quantity demanded with respect to income, we know less. ¶x/
¶M can be positive or negative. If this term is merely [140/141] negative, the commodity
is called an inferior good. This is the income effect and if it is large enough in concert
with x, it can dominate the substitution effect. In this case, the commodity is called a
Giffen good. The composite is then indeterminate in sign.
If ¶x/ ¶p is indeterminate in sign, the demand curve can be upward sloping. This is the
Giffen paradox: it is supposed that at a low level of income, as the price of a Giffen good
rises, a greater quantity of the good is consumed. How does this indeterminacy bear on
the falsifiability of consumer's demand theory?
In terms of our discussion of modus tollens, let us call traditional consumer's demand
theory H. Then from the theory we deduce an equivocally signed demand curve:
H ﬁ  [¶x/ ¶p ‡ 0] v [¶x/ ¶p < 0]
It is readily apparent that this conditional is a tautology. Hence, under these conditions,
demand theory is not falsifiable.
To rectify this patently undesirable state of affairs, De Alessi suggests imposing as a
condition on the form of individual utility functions that the absolute value of the
deduced income effect is less than the absolute value of the deduced substitution effect in
the case of inferior goods./5/
This condition, which we will call A, can be expressed formally as:
A ” [¶x/ ¶M < 0] ﬁ [|¶x/ ¶M| < |¶x/ ¶p|] .
The conjunction of A and H gives the following conditional:
H & A ﬁ  ¶x/ ¶p < 0.
If we examine just the consequent of this conditional, we notice that the consequent is no
longer tautologically true. Thus the consequent can be empirically tested and possibly
false. We can consider that we have derived, in Samuelson's words, the "so-called law of
diminishing demand." We then ask whether the introduction of condition A renders thetheory of consumer's demand falsifiable. We should note that Samuelson calls such an
assumption as A "demonstrably arbitrary"./6/ [141/142]
II.
Professor De Alessi inquires as to criteria for determining where an assumption, such as
his condition A, is arbitrary. As we shall see, there are methodological grounds sufficient
for this judgment. These methodological grounds require the introduction of more general
considerations.
The problem of the falsifiability of a component of a theoretical system in the presence of
auxiliary conditions such as A has recently received great attention in the literature of
philosophy of science. The problem has been labelled the "D-thesis" and has been
signally studied by Professor Adolf Grünbaum. We can summarize the problem and his
argument as follows./7/   Consider a theory H and an auxiliary condition A. The theory is
to be tested by virtue of an observation O. As we have seen, by modus tollens, from H ﬁ
O and not O, we can infer not H. Thus, the theory is falsifiable. If, however, we conjoin
to H the auxiliary condition A, then we find H & A ﬁ O, and from not O, we have not H
or not A. The D-thesis asserts that there is no logical ground for the rejection of not A as
an implicate, hence the theory is not falsifiable.
Further, in the presence of a disconfirming instance O, the investigator can always
preserve the theory by rejecting the auxiliary hypothesis. As Andreas Papandreou has
noted, the economist typically conjoins to his theory a set of auxiliary assumptions
because he refuses to take his chances with a theory that is prima facie refutable./8/
Thus the D-thesis would seem to be quite germane to economics.
Professor Grünbaum has proposed the following criterion in such cases: The rejection of
A is legitimate precisely to the extent that its verification independent of the assumption
of H suffers from inductive uncertainty./9/ Thus, we must provide answers to the
questions:
(a) Was A verified independently of H?
(b) Was this verification inductively certain?
Evidently the answer to (b) awaits an affirmative answer to question (a). This concurs
with De Alessi's argument that the acceptability of A is "determined by the empirical
validity of its implications relative to [142/143] the empirical validity of the implications
of competing 'assumptions'."/10/ We will merely note here that not A is certainly a
"competing assumption," and has the virtue of simplicity vis a vis A, were the two
equivalent in other respects./11/
To verify A independently of the assumption of H requires that the following relationship
be observable:
¶x/ ¶p <  ¶x/ ¶M < 0
There are two considerations here.  One is that to insure sufficient degrees of freedom toestimate these two effects, it is necessary that a nested design be employed, whereby all
income effects are dichotomized into those positively and those negatively signed.  Then
within the latter set, an examination of all substitution effects must insure that the above
relationship exists.
Secondly, it is further necessary, both to insure the independence of H and A, as well as
to prevent the confounding in effect of DM and Dp, that the income effects temporally as
well as logically precede the substitution effects. As Professor Lloyd has pointed out, "we
need at least two different observations of consumption changes at different points in
time"/12/.
But such intertemporal comparisons require the specification of ceteris paribus.  For
instance, consumer tastes, as well as a myriad of other factors should not change during
the time period under study.  Hence a necessary condition for the possibility of
independent verification of A for DeAlessi is whether one can fulfil ceteris paribus here.
Notice this is only necessary and not sufficient for the verification of A.  We will see that
it is not possible in his terms for De Alessi to fulfil ceteris paribus, hence impossible to
establish A.
III.
It is a curious argument indeed which De Alessi forwards regarding ceteris paribus. He
presents two points, the first, that
 The choice of variables that may be impounded in ceteris paribus depends upon
the problem being considered [143/144]
and the second, that this choice is
determined by the usefulness of the additional accuracy, if any, that may be
obtained by explicitly considering additional variables relative to the additional
cost of including such variables./13/
Let us trace briefly the history of this argument.
De Alessi cites James Buchanan on his first point. Indeed, Buchanan, in his analysis of
the relationship between ceteris paribus and partial equilibrium analysis, indicates that if
the purposes of analysis are purely formal, all of the variables except two can be placed
literally in ceteris paribus./14/   This is clearly a special case of De Alessi's "types of
problems under consideration." For the formal activity of partial equilibrium analysis, it
is unexceptional that after conceptually isolating the market under study, the economist
neglects the remainder of the variables./15/
However, where the activity is instead that of empirical validation of the implications of a
theoretical assumption, which is De Alessi's activity,/16/  Professor Buchanan provides
little support, other than noting that "the predictive error involved in neglecting all
offsetting or compensating variations... need not be large."/17/   Further, in the case of
empirical validation as contrasted with partial equilibrium analysis, De Alessi's first point
is the logical error of petitio principii. It is invalid to suppose that one knows which of the
set of possible factors do have a significant effect on the dependent variable. RegardingDe Alessi's first point, then, we must conclude that unless he can show a criterion for the
impounding of variables,/18/ we must reject his first point: there is otherwise no "choice
of variables."
We turn then to point two. Here De Alessi proposes, as a criterion for the consideration of
additional variables, to ascertain the utility and cost of each if it was explicitly treated.
Implicit is the supposition that an algorithm can be specified, whereby the investigator
considers first this variable, then the next variable, etc. In each instance he compares cost
and utility. Two comments are in order here.[144/145]
First, such a supposition requires that the number of variables to be considered is at most
denumerable. The contrary, i. e. that the number of possibly relevant variables is non-
denumerably many, has been maintained by a number of investigators, including Fisher,
Georgescu-Roegen, and Hildreth./19/   If the number of variables which might be
impounded is not denumerable, then by Cantor's Theorem, De Alessi's proposal is
contradicted, since the implicit algorithm cannot exist.
A number of investigators have not only supposed that the number of variables
confronting the investigator was denumerable, but also that it was finite. Both Arthur
Marget/20/ and Richard Brumberg/21/ assumed that there was a finite number of
variables under consideration when the extension of ceteris paribus was in question.
These investigators, as well as Professor Friedman,/22/ were perhaps mislead by Alfred
Marshall's tautological treatment of ceteris paribus, in his Principles, for analytical
purposes.
Marshall, it will be recalled, in his general law of demand, stated that a functional relation
existed between the quantity demanded and the price of a commodity. This commodity
was constrained to a market "during a given time and under given conditions," which is
an implicit ceteris paribus condition. He continues: "If the conditions vary in any respect
the prices will probably require to be changed."/23/  Since all conditions [145/146] but
quantity and price are constant, we have the purely formal analysis which Buchanan
noted.
So much for the formalism of partial equilibrium analysis, where the conceptual
restriction of the analysis to two variables, with several others impounded in ceteris
paribus is legitimate. When we turn, on the other hand, to problems of empirical
validation, we find clear evidence that Marshall carefully qualifies himself by asserting
that in the real world of statistical estimation, "other things seldom are equal...."/24/
Certainly the proposal to compare the utility and cost of impounding additional variables
has little support. It appears that De Alessi's proposed criterion for ceteris paribus may
rest on a misreading of Marshall. Be that as it may, in light of the distinction between
partial equilibrium analysis and the empirical validation of a set of assumptions the
problem of fulfilling ceteris paribus does not appear possible of solution in this fashion.
On this ground, we find ceteris paribus unfulfilled, hence De Alessi's suggestion of a
condition A on the individual utility functions to be arbitrary.IV.
In conclusion then, we have examined the problem the Giffen paradox presents to the
refutability of micro-economic theory. To resolve the problem, De Alessi suggested a
restriction on the admissible magnitude of income effects. While tracing out the
implication of this suggestion, we found that a necessary condition was the fulfilling of
ceteris paribus. As this is not accomplished in De Alessi's terms, and does not even
appear possible in his terms, we must conclude his restriction to be demonstrably
arbitrary.
Two points remain. We should not be so understood that ceteris paribus is considered
impossible of fulfillment. As we have discussed this problem elsewhere,/25/ we will not
pursue it further here. Secondly, to establish the refutability of traditional consumer's
demand theory, and to resolve the Giffen paradox, seems to require an explicit
institutional embedding of the socio-economic model under study./26/   There is certainly
a problem  here of parametric stability,/27/ but this problem is perhaps part of the
economists' burden.[146//]
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